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CONFIDENCE-BUILDING THROUGH 
MINE ACTION ON THE 
KOREAN PENINSULA
T
he Korean Peninsula is divided by a strip of land, the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which represents the de facto 
border between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK), more commonly known as North Korea, and the Republic of 
Korea (ROK), or South Korea. Contrary to its name, the DMZ is the 
most militarized zone on earth, and it delineates a stand-off between 
militaries composed of several million professional and reservist sol-
diers on both sides. It is the “Cold War’s last divide”1 and one of the 
most symbolic barriers between two nations. It is also heavily mined 
with both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines, and contami-
nated with unexploded ordnance (UXO) from extensive ground bat-
tles and heavy aerial bombardment.
This article explores the nature and extent of explosive ordnance 
contamination and the physical environment within the DMZ. It 
considers recent changes in the political landscape that have allowed 
unprecedented developments within the DMZ to take place—includ-
ing coordinated demining operations between military forces of 
North and South Korea, as well as the beginning of a human remains 
recovery program. 
Joint demining operations are currently suspended and the political 
situation remains complex, but mines do not go away. The opportu-
nity that mine action offers to contribute to confidence building on the 
Korean Peninsula is without parallel; such potential is explored here.
In this context and notwithstanding the considerable expertise, 
resources, and perspectives of the two Koreas and that of the US-led 
United Nations Command (UNC),2 this article suggests a vision for the 
architecture of mine action on the peninsula. This includes thoughts 
on further developing the legal and institutional frameworks for the 
sector and the potential role that the international community may 
offer in contributing to peace dividends, both by its presence, and its 
experience gained elsewhere in the world that may have application 
in Korea.
HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR AND THE 
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
In the English-speaking world, the Korean War has been called “The 
Forgotten War,” as its memory is often overshadowed by World War 
II and the Vietnam War. It was, however, one of the most devastat-
ing conflicts of the modern era. It incurred the destruction of virtu-
ally all of Korea’s major cities and resulted in approximately 3 million 
war fatalities with a larger proportional civilian death toll than either 
World War II or the Vietnam War.3
The conflict was between North Korea (with the support of China 
and the Soviet Union) and South Korea (with the support of the UNC, 
principally the United States but with combat troops from sixteen 
additional states under a UN Flag). It began on 25 June 1950 and 
ended on 27 July 1953 when the UNC and the Chinese-North Korean 
Command signed the Korean Armistice Agreement.
The armistice established the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and 
the DMZ, a 4 km wide and 250 km long fortified buffer zone between 
the two Korean nations. After the agreement, a withdrawal of forces 
and the rapid establishment of the DMZ left thousands of human 
remains within its boundaries, which are only now being recovered. 
The armistice remains only a cease-fire arrangement between military 
forces rather than an agreement between governments to normalize 
relations. No formal peace treaty has been signed, and the two nations 
technically remain at war. 
Handshake between North and South Korean Military at the DMZ, October 2018.
Image courtesy of MND Archives.
Signing of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.
Photo courtesy of File/AP.
By Guy Rhodes, Ph.D. [ Geneva Centre for Security Policy ]
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Missile Crisis (1962) and the buildup to 
the Seoul Olympics (1988). 
Contamination originating from 
ground battles and aerial bombard-
ment such as grenades, artillery shells, 
and mortars is widespread but less well 
defined. It is present on the surface of the 
ground and at shallow depths, and in the 
case of air-delivered bombs, often at con-
siderable depth. 
Table 1 details contamination known 
in the DMZ and CCZ as reported by 
the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. The exact 
number could be appreciably more, with 
some sources quoting between 1 and 1.2 
million mines in total on the south side. 
Far less is known about the mine-laying 
strategies and quantities of mines deployed by North Korean forces. 
The numbers of mines are reported to be at least as many as those to 
the south of the MDL, with some sources suggesting numbers may be 
twice as high.6
THE CHANGING POLITICAL CONTEXT ON THE 
KOREAN PENINSULA, 2018–2020
Although the political situation has become more complex on the 
peninsula since the Hanoi Summit between the United States and 
North Korea in February 2019, the developments that occurred in 
2018 were ground breaking. On 27 April 2018, the two Koreas held 
a summit between South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in and North 
Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong Un. This meeting resulted in the two 
leaders signing the Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and 
Reunification of the Korean Peninsula. 
The Panmunjom Declaration led to 
other bilateral declarations and sum-
mits involving South Korea, North 
Korea, and the United States. On 19 Sep-
tember 2018, the respective Ministers 
of Defense for North and South Korea 
signed an unprecedented Comprehen-
sive Military Agreement (CMA). 
BORDER AREA ZONING 
The DMZ and surrounding border areas to the south are divided 
into three zones: the DMZ itself, the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), and 
the Border Area (Figure 1). The DMZ is split 2 km north and 2 km 
south of the MDL, with half of the DMZ located in the ROK and half 
in the DPRK. The outer limits of the DMZ are termed the Northern 
Limit Line (NLL) and Southern Limit Line (SLL). This area was estab-
lished to safeguard against incidents that may provoke hostilities,4 and 
in accordance with the armistice, the jurisdiction for the southern por-
tion of the DMZ falls under the responsibility of the US-led UNC.5 
Conversely, the jurisdiction of the CCZ rests with the ROK Army, and 
the Border Area under that of the local governments.
 
EXTENT AND NATURE OF THE EXPLOSIVE 
ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION 
Landmines and UXO are present in all three zones of jurisdiction on 
the ROK side of the border: the DMZ, the CCZ, and the northern parts of 
the Border Area. They are also present around some military installations 
and bases elsewhere on the southern portion of the peninsula. 
Mined areas in the DMZ, and to some extent the CCZ, are not as 
defined as one might expect. While many minefields have records, 
mines have also been air-delivered and laid hastily, creating uncer-
tainty in several areas. In addition, variation in statistics may also 
be reflective of failures in knowledge management practices over the 
past sixty-seven years. Much of the contamination is ageing, although 
there have been periods of mine replenishment and reinforcement 
during periods of heightened tension—such as during the Cuban 
Figure 1. Map of the central portion of the Korean Peninsula showing the DMZ and surrounding border areas.
Figure courtesy of Park Eun-Jin et al, 2012.
Total
Controlled Protection Zones Restricted Protection 




Sites 1,308 786(15 undocumented)
433 
(276 undocumented) 22 67
Mines 828,000 380,000 389,000 50,000 9,000
Table 1. Status of confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) in South Korea. 
Table courtesy of Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS).
Signing of the CMA by ROK and DPRK Ministers of Defense, September 2018. 
Image courtesy of Pyeongyang Press Corps.
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The CMA focused on five areas: (1) suspension of hostile activities, 
(2) military measures to transform the DMZ into a peace zone, (3) 
establishment of a marine peace zone, (4) military communication and 
exchange, and (5) measures to promote military confidence building.
Of particular interest for this article are the two annexes to the CMA 
concerning demining operations at the Joint Security Area (JSA) at 
Panmunjom, and at the former battle ground at Arrowhead Hill. These 
annexes set the scene for collaborative demining operations between 
the ROK, DPRK, and the UNC that began on 1 October 2018—a joint 
activity that was unimaginable twelve months before. While engage-
ment occurred for a period, subsequent strained relations led to an 
effective freeze in confidence-building initiatives, and joint opera-
tions did not resume in 2019. This remains the status quo as of June 
2020; however, mines do not disappear, and the political environment 
can change quickly. For the time being, ROK Army demining units, 
supported by the UNC continue to work unilaterally, but mine action 
will continue to offer considerable opportunities and powerful optics 
for confidence building between the DPRK and ROK when conditions 
again become conducive. 
DEMINING OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ
Demining operations in South Korea before 2018 were largely 
restricted to areas away from the DMZ. Table 2 illustrates the clear-
ance statistics from 1998–2017. A total of 65,720 mines were cleared 
Location Year Area Mines Removed
CCZ 2006–2017 14 sites 1,443
Southern CCL/
Border Areas 2005–2017 42 sites 5,405
Rear Areas 1998–2017 76 sites 58,872
Total 132 65,720
Table 2. Mine clearance status to 2017 from ROK military operations.
Table courtesy of Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS).
from the CCZ, southern edge of the Civilian 
Control Line (CCL), and particularly from sites 
around military bases and installations in the 
Rear Areas across the ROK.
Since 2018 and under the auspices of the CMA, 
clearance activities within the DMZ itself have 
been undertaken at the JSA at Panmunjom and at 
the formal battle site at Arrowhead Hill. 
Demining at the Joint Security Area (Figure 2 
Label 4). The Panmunjom JSA is the only portion 
of the DMZ where North and South Korean forces 
stand face-to-face. The JSA is used for diplomatic 
engagements. 
Deminers from the 127 ROK Army Engineering 
Battalion, supported by the UNC, conducted 
operations within the southern portion of the JSA 
(shaded blue in Figure 3). The U.S. Army Corps of 
First tri-lateral negotiations on the implementation of the CMA, 16 October 2018. 
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.
Figure 2. Key elements of the Comprehensive Military Agreement.
Figure courtesy of an illustration in Global Asia Vol 14, no. 2, June 2019.
Engineers and representation from the U.S. Department of State acted 
as observers. In northern zones (shaded yellow), the Korean People’s 
Army (KPA) conducted its own independent clearance operations.7 
At times, ROK-UNC teams were in proximity to DPRK teams and 
exchanged cordial greetings and conversations. Both sides focused on 
areas of suspected mine and UXO contamination with the intent to 
further demilitarize the JSA and support greater tourist circulation. 
The operations are now complete on the south side and declared com-
plete on the north.
Operations of the ROK Army in the southern sectors between 1 and 
19 October cleared 36,461 sq m of land and recovered considerable 
quantities of metal debris, but no mines were present. To the north, the 
KPA were observed conducting demining operations at three localities 
between 1 and 18 October. The KPA appeared to use detectors, primi-
tive probes, and pitch-fork-style tools within operations that claimed 
the removal and destruction of 636 mines.8
An underlying challenge during the JSA clearance task was the lack 
of common standards for operations, particularly in quality manage-
ment procedures for released land. Both the ROK Army and the DPRK 
KPA used different military doctrines for demining, and there was a 
disparity in demining resources and equipment. In the longer term, 
the UNC suggests that joint mine action operations would benefit from 
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ROK-Army deminers at JSA. 
Image courtesy of LTC S. Morrow.
Access route cleared by KPA to Arrowhead Hill to facilitate demining. 
Image courtesy of MND Archives. 
Human remains recovery, Arrowhead Hill. 
Image courtesy of The Wall Street Journal.
Figure 3. JSA demining zones.
Figure courtesy of LTC S. Morrow.
being based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)—
adapted to the context and conditions of the DMZ.
Arrowhead Hill demining to support human remains recovery 
(Figure 2 Label 5). Atop of a little-known ridge in the Cheorwon 
Valley almost seven decades ago, French, South Korean, and American 
troops fought off waves of mainly Chinese communist forces in a series 
of trench battles that marked some of the bloodiest days of the Korean 
War. Hundreds of the fallen were never recovered. Of the Chinese and 
South Korean losses alone, it is estimated that 6,700 and 14,332 troops 
fell, respectively. Over a nine-day period, the U.S. Air Force dropped 
2,700 bombs, the Chinese fired 55,000 shells, and South Korea fired 
185,000 more around Hill 281, also known as Arrowhead Hill.9
Under the CMA, the first joint remains recovery task in the 
DMZ was conducted at Arrowhead Hill. This included the con-
struction of a 3 km access road (1.7 km from the south side and 
1.3 km from the north) to serve mine clearance and joint remains 
recovery operations. 
The joint operations with the DPRK in 2018 did not continue when 
demining by the ROK resumed in the southern half of the DMZ at 
Arrowhead Hill in April 2019 following a deterioration of relations 
among parties to the conflict in early 2019. However, the ROK Army 
and UNC made a decision to continue the operation. When clear-
ance concluded for the winter in November 2019, 102,688 sq m of land 
had been released, 455 mines and 5,754 UXO cleared, and 261 sets of 
human remains recovered. 
Future plans for the human remains recovery program. The 
remains recovery program for 2020 is planned to first be completed at 
Arrowhead Hill. Beyond this site operations are envisaged to continue 
in the spirit of the CMA on a unilateral basis by demining units of 
the ROK Army supported by the UNC. In conjunction with records 
supplied by the Sending States,10 operations will focus on additional 
battle sites not specified in the CMA that are expected to yield more 
remains. Possible sites may be drawn from the conflict zones such 
as Bunker Hill, Old Baldy, Iron Triangle, Northern Punchbowl, and 
Heartbreak Ridge.
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Indeed, since the signing of the armistice in 
1953, there has been a revival of wild habitats 
in the absence of human activity. According to 
the National Institute of Ecology (2018),11 6,168 
species of flora and fauna have been docu-
mented in the DMZ with 102 species classified 
as endangered or vulnerable. These are spread 
across varied landscapes of wetlands, plains, 
and mountains from the Imjin River Estuary in 
the west to the coastal region of the east.
Conducting survey and clearance opera-
tions in this wildlife refuge carries a tre-
mendous responsibility and demands the 
utmost respect for the environment. By its 
very nature, demining is disruptive, but there 
are many approaches to mitigate its impact. 
IMAS 07.13 Environmental Management in 
Mine Action is a good point of departure, 
but future National Mine Action Standards 
for Korea (yet to be developed) should be 
far more comprehensive and prescriptive in 
nature. The competing challenges of demin-
ing and environmental preservation call on 
heightened collaboration between authori-
ties concerned with clearance operations and 
those institutions and ministries dealing with 
conservation of the natural habitat. 
Appropriate demining methods and tools will 
need to be considered together with integrated 
planning and priority-setting approaches that 
are responsive to ecological sensitivities. In 
some cases, this may be achieved through tim-
ing and sequencing of operations that do not conflict with the nesting 
and mating cycles of endangered birds and mammals. In others, con-
sideration of the diminishing risk from ageing ordnance may support 
a decision that certain areas of particular environmental importance 
will not be prioritized, at least not as a starting point. Considering the 
enormous size of the DMZ and the reality that clearance operations 
will take decades to complete, this would appear entirely reasonable, 
Human remains excavation. 
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.
Remains are honored. 
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.
Figure 4. Battle site locations of potential DMZ Remains Recovery and Demining Operations 2020+. 
Figure courtesy of a MND/UNC presentation, Geneva, February 2020. 
THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND BIODIVERSITY 
OF THE DMZ 
In his address at the 74th United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) in September 2019, ROK President Moon Jae-in described the 
DMZ as “a colossal green zone…its borders define a tragedy spawned 
by 70 years of military confrontation, but paradoxically, it has become 
a pristine ecological treasure trove.” 
Figure 5. Biodiversity report of the DMZ Area/MOE-NIE (2016).
Figure courtesy of Ministry of Environment, National Institute of Ecology (2016).
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especially if the threat from explosive hazards in these areas is low, 
poorly-defined, or deeply-buried. Mine action is about manageing risk 
from explosive ordnance; searching every square meter of the DMZ for 
explosive devices is unnecessary.
Certain conservation areas may be managed by continuing to limit 
or exclude human activity through signage and education. This would 
be consistent with some areas contaminated by explosive ordnance 
in Western Europe that remain “out of bounds” to the general pub-
lic, such as the former Soviet military training range at Wittstock, 
Brandenburg, located in the former East Germany. 
POTENTIAL ROLE AND CONTRIBUTION FROM THE 
INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION COMMUNITY
At the 74th UNGA, President Moon also presented a vision to 
transform the DMZ into an international peace zone, “The DMZ has 
become a symbolic space steeped in history, which embraces both the 
tragedy of division as embodied by the JSA, guard posts and barbed-
wire fences as well as the yearning for peace. The DMZ is the com-
mon heritage of humankind, and its value must be shared with the 
whole world. Once peace is established between the two Koreas, I will 
work together with North Korea to inscribe the DMZ as a UNESCO 
World Heritage Site.” He went on to say, “Approximately 380,000 anti- 
personnel mines are laid in the DMZ, and it is expected to take 15 years 
for South Korean troops to remove them on their own.”12 However, 
cooperation with the international community, including the United 
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), will not only guarantee the 
transparency and stability of demining operations, but also instantly 
turn the DMZ into an area of international cooperation.”13
Notwithstanding security considerations, current legislation 
restrictions, and necessary solutions for appropriate funding mech-
anisms, the addition of the international community working in the 
DMZ would serve two principal objectives: (1) it would offer addi-
tional capacity, and (2) perhaps more important, it would be a sig-
nificant step in further demilitarizing the border zone. 
International NGOs and the United Nations strive to uphold the 
humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity, and 
independence; and could provide an additional “face;” and offer fur-
ther tools and approaches to contribute to the goal of securing sustain-
able peace. They also come with thirty years of humanitarian demining 
experience—gained through working in conflict zones, humanitarian 
International Seminar November 2018. NGO’s Role for Mine Clearance in the DMZ, 
including UNMAS, UNDP, ICRC, GICHD, HALO, NPA, APMBC-ISU, GMAP, FSD, ICBL, 
JCBL, and PCBL.
Image courtesy of the Peace Sharing Association (PSA).
crises, peace-keeping frameworks, and in assisted development and 
development contexts. Such an international capacity should not be 
considered as competition to the highly-trained and equipped ROK 
Army demining units but rather a different type of capacity that pres-
ents additional opportunities. 
International organizations are committed to assist in the world-
wide clearance of landmines and UXO but are particularly motivated 
by contexts where mine action can also contribute to a greater goal. 
Nowhere is this potential more evident than on the Korean Peninsula. 
Although somewhat distant at present, future assistance may also be 
channeled through Pyongyang, although the sanction regime and 
position of the North Korean government currently render this pros-
pect as fanciful. Demining on the Korean Peninsula, however, should 
be considered a long-term prospect. 
The DPRK is a more natural partner for international organiza-
tions, as the ROK is not a recipient of aid—indeed it is a considerable 
international donor itself for mine action. The ROK is an economic 
heavyweight with a gross domestic product that exceeds many of 
the principal international donors such as Australia, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, and Norway. However, the context on the Korean 
Peninsula is not a normal one. In order to maximize peace dividends, a 
coordinated approach that draws on national and international capaci-
ties and skillsets may be more effective. 
Importantly, the UNC is unequivocal in its support of President 
Moon’s vision of clearing the DMZ of landmines and UXO. This has 
been reiterated on several occasions by General Robert Abrams, the 
Commander of the UNC and U.S. Forces Korea. Furthermore, the 
addition of international expertise and capacity, including interna-
tional NGOs, is also supported by the UNC.
Mine Action Workshop, January 2019. United Nations Command, US Forces Korea, 
Combined Forces Command, 8th Army, ICRC, UNMAS, ROK Ministry of National 
Defense, ROK Army, ROK MoFA, US Army Corps of Engineers, The HALO Trust, NPA, 
MAG, GICHD, US DoS, Norwegian Embassy, Netherlands Embassy, British Embassy, 
Australian Embassy.
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING OF 
MINE ACTION FRAMEWORKS ON THE KOREAN 
PENINSULA
Demining the DMZ is a considerable undertaking, which will take 
decades. Whether operations are upscaled soon or in a few years, it 
takes time to establish the legal, institutional, strategic, and opera-
tional frameworks to support such a considerable task. It is vital that 
an appropriate framework is established at an early stage in order to 
maintain confidence in the safety, quality, and environmental accept-
ability of survey and clearance operations whether they be delivered by 
military, commercial, or NGO capacities. 
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Institutions. It is important to establish an appropriate legal and 
institutional framework to accommodate expanding programs, par-
ticularly if a variety of demining operators are to be employed. Such a 
framework should define an architecture of regulation, management, 
and coordination. More than just a technical activity, demining has 
implications across ministries and sectors. This should be reflected in 
the governance structure with a view to corresponding architecture 
within the North Korean authorities.
There are many variations on institutional frameworks for mine 
action programs that have varying degrees of military and civilian rep-
resentation and authority. In the context of Korea, this will inevitably 
be skewed towards the military. In a generic model, the most senior 
level—a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), perhaps under the 
prime minister—is typically responsible for policy and coordination 
across ministries, which include those with implementation respon-
sibilities (Defense and Foreign Affairs), those affected by contamina-
tion (Environment and Agriculture), and those with economic roles 
(Planning and Finance). The NMAA would normally approve the 
overall mine action strategy, national standards, annual workplans, 
and priorities. With jurisdiction over the DMZ in the ROK, the UNC 
should also be positioned appropriately for decision-making proce-
dures linked to either the NMAA or the Mine Action Centre (MAC).
Below the NMAA, the MAC typically coordinates national and inter-
national operators. It manages daily operations that could include mine 
risk education and victim assistance, while also monitoring the qual-
ity of operations. The MAC would also be responsible for information 
management, including the national database, and developing national 
mine action standards (NMAS). The Ministry of National Defense 
(MND) may serve as a suitable host for such an office and function.
At an operational level, implementers could potentially be national 
or international organizations, military units, or non-profit/commer-
cial entities. They operate in accordance with NMAS and are usually 
accredited and monitored by teams from the MAC.
 Standards. A peace zone is compromised if accidents occur after 
demining operations take place or if the safety of the land is in ques-
tion. Confidence-building measures can be damaged or reversed if 
mines remain in the ground and subsequent injury or death occurs. 
A common reference framework could have been beneficial during 
the 2018–2019 operations at the JSA and Arrowhead Hill. Observations 
of the demining that occurred under the CMA, particularly to the 
north of the MDL, raised some questions about the reliability of the 
procedures and quality management systems in use.
The IMAS are the reference standards for the United Nations and 
international community, developed over the course of twenty years by 
a wide range of mine action stakeholders. The IMAS are used in over 
fifty countries, including by
• the UK government for clearance operations on the Falkland 
Islands,
• the US Humanitarian Demining Training Center as a basis for 
training US forces, and
• the Chinese military undertaking demining in Peace Keeping 
Operations. 
In 2019, the MND commissioned the Peace Sharing Association 
Figure 6. Front cover of the IMAS in Korean.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
Figure 7. Relationship between IMAS, NMAS, SOPs, and 
training material.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
(PSA) to translate the IMAS into Korean. This was completed and pro-
vides a comprehensive set of documents from which to draw upon to 
develop the National (Korean) Mine Action Standards (KMAS). These 
should be adapted to the context of the peninsula while remaining 
compliant to the overarching IMAS. 
The KMAS will be defined by the ROK authorities. If adopted, the 
KMAS would ensure that different organizations deliver a common 
and consistent approach to demining, ensuring safety, efficiency and 
effectiveness, and confidence that the quality of cleared land is main-
tained and assured. 
Recent developments offer the option to database the Korean version 
of the IMAS to facilitate the navigation and interrogation of more than 
1,000 pages of technical material. Such an exercise has only recently 
been completed for the IMAS in English.14 Bringing the Korean version 
into the newly established IMAS database would provide the peninsula 
with a tool at the forefront of the global mine action sector. 
By databasing the requirements and recommendations of IMAS, 
Korea will be able to dynamically filter the standards to create targeted 
checklists for self-assessment or external-compliance monitoring pur-
poses. Korea could benefit from the work already done, which would 
allow a straightforward review of existing military doctrines against 
IMAS, identifying and addressing any gaps that may be present.15
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The IMAS have a close relationship with international conventions 
on disarmament and are the reference point for donors and spon-
sors of mine action. International financial support will be important 
for the future of the peninsula, particularly initiatives in the north. 
Funding would be more forthcoming if programs operated within the 
recognized framework of IMAS. When conducive, moving towards 
a common framework for the entire peninsula has potential to be an 
important process.
Information Management. For the considerable task of demin-
ing the DMZ, a state-of-the-art information management system is 
essential. Databases and geographic information systems provide 
the means to inform decision makers 
and to manage and monitor operations. 
Moreover, they record what activities 
were completed where, when, and by 
whom. This safeguards against duplica-
tion, facilitates planning and reporting, 
and may be important to address any 
future liability considerations. 
The information management data-
base stores information on known or sus-
pected areas of contamination together 
with other datasets such as access routes, 
vegetation cover, topography, land own-
ership, various war archive data, and 
environmental information—ideally in 
an integrated system to support plan-
ning and priority setting. It should be 
designed and developed with the whole 
DMZ in mind. Understanding that some 
data is sensitive, information management 
systems can easily be designed to have dif-
ferent levels of access and authority, but it is important to balance 
appropriate transparency with security and other considerations.
Research. There are many opportunities to share cross-border 
experiences and knowledge, but one research area stands out when 
considering demining and the importance of the preservation of the 
environment. This is the understanding of how risk changes as muni-
tions age. What are the impacts of changing circumstances and condi-
tions that surround mines and UXO on the Korean Peninsula? This has 
great implications when making informed decisions on priority setting 
and balancing risk from explosive devices with a desire to retain the 
integrity of a fragile environment. 
Figure 8. A visual example displaying mine contamination data.
Figure reproduction of a slide used by the author at the DMZ Global Forum in Seoul, November 2019.
Figure 9. Generic illustration of the ageing process of different components of 
a mine. 
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
M16 mine with fuse and weathered M16 without.PMD-6 box mine.
Images courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
Weathered PMD-6 mine.
The ageing process affects different devices in different ways. 
The energy required for arming and initiation of mines is often 
supplied by springs. Where springs have corroded, the munition 
is incapable of functioning as designed. For instance, the wooden 
box mine, which is understood to have been widely used by North 
Korean forces, has a case that is prone to disintegrate over time.16 
It also has a fuse with a firing chain that can be disrupted by cor-
rosion. In the south, the M16 mine is metallic and rusts over time.
It may become unrecognizable. Other mines such as the M14 
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anti-personnel mine are more resilient. However, there is some 
reassurance that mines will pose a diminishing risk in the long 
term, but it is difficult to quantify. 
THE VISION FOR MINE ACTION ON THE 
PENINSULA
However fanciful, programs should have a vision. The vision for 
the Korean Peninsula is that an architecture for demining the DMZ 
is jointly owned by both North and South Korea, and that demining 
operations address shared objectives and priorities and are undertaken 
in accordance with common practices within a framework of recog-
nized international norms. 
When it eventually comes, the signing of a Peace Agreement will 
provide an opportunity to establish a more integrated institutional 
framework with North Korea to reinforce a unified approach to 
demining the DMZ. This could involve elements of a joint author-
ity and steps towards a common MAC. In the meantime, much can 
be done unilaterally to advance mine action programs, involve the 
international community, and explore further how mine action 
activities can be used to build confidence on the Korean Peninsula.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Peace on the Korean Peninsula remains a long process, and while 
the climate for confidence-building opportunities is currently at a low 
ebb, landmines in the DMZ do not go away. Nor do the opportunities 
that mine action offers to contribute to reconciliation and peace.
It takes time to adapt an architecture for mine action outside a 
purely military lens, but this is necessary to establish the fundamen-
tals needed to underpin all opportunities for mine action in the future. 
President Moon has a vision for a peace zone in the DMZ free from 
mines and UXO, and he believes that cooperation with the interna-
tional community will both guarantee the transparency and stability 
of demining operations and help turn the DMZ into an area of interna-
tional cooperation. This vision is supported by the UNC.
To help prepare for future work, the relevant authorities could 
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First, adjusting national legislation for mine action to allow non-
military capacities to contribute to demining. 
Second, ensuring that the institutional and strategic frameworks 
for mine action reflect the inter-ministerial nature of the problem and 
support a longer-term goal of a joint mine action architecture for the 
entire peninsula. The MND in its appropriate role could also strive to 
be more accessible and open for exchange.
Third, further adaptation of operational frameworks such as stan-
dards in operations (including quality management systems) of the 
military and alignment with recognized international norms and 
practices. The development of KMAS based on IMAS offers an early 
and significant opportunity in this respect.
Fourth, pursuit of research and international exchange on perti-
nent issues of relevance to Korea. For example, the management of 
risk concerning ageing explosive ordnance, mitigation approaches 
towards environmental impact, advanced prioritization schemes for 
operations, and appropriate information management systems and 
processes that are fit for purpose.
Fifth, promotion of information sharing and appropriate trans-
parency with the DPRK to inform the process of developing a mine 
action machinery that is geared toward peace, not war. Optics are 
important. Consideration could be given to having deminers dressed 
in a neutral attire rather than military fatigues. 
These suggested adjustments to the mine action ethos and architec-
ture in Korea will help ensure the success of operations, where “suc-
cess” will be measured in peace dividends that are linked to safety and 
confidence of cleared land and the value of activities that mine action 
helps to facilitate. 
In the absence of collaboration with the DPRK, a reformed mine 
action sector in the ROK will be beneficial to support unilateral activi-
ties. It will also ensure that the ROK is well equipped to accommodate 
all confidence-building opportunities that mine action can offer, and 
in addition, position itself to support the inevitable upscaling of opera-
tions in the future. 
See endnotes page 68
Figure 10. A vision of linked institutions, joint mine action strategies, 
and operations on the Korean Peninsula.
Figure courtesy of the author.
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